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The Federal Common Law
By

JOHN

W.

NEWMAN, JR.

of the Nebraska Bar*

The purpose of this paper will be to point out some of the fields of law
wherein the courts may still apply a federal common law since the case of
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins ' was decided in 1938. This paper will not
purport to deal with the other types of law applicable in the federal courts
but will confine itself to the narrow issue of when federal common law will
be applied.
It is impossible to begin any consideration of what is left of the federal
common law without discussing the Erie case, in which case Mr. Justice
Brandeis uttered his famous dictum that "there is no federal general common
law". 2 That Justice Brandeis intended this statement to be read in the light
of his whole opinion is clear not only from an examination of the entire pronouncement, but also from his own opinion in another case 3 decided the
same day. In this latter case he stated, "For whether the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned between the two states is a question of
'federal common law' upon which neither the statutes nor the decisions of
either state can be conclusive". 4 From this statement, it becomes immediately
apparent that there will be at least some room for the application of the
federal common law to the exclusion of the common law as determined by
the state courts.
For a while after the decision in the Erie case, there was much uncertainty as to the fields in which federal common law could operate. The decisions of the United States Supreme Court since 1938 have not removed all
doubts upon this question; however, there does seem to have unfolded a fairly
consistent pattern for the application of federal common law in specific types
"exceptions" to the Erie case,
of cases. These cases, as we will see, are not
5
but rather are outside the scope of that case.
error.

In the Erie case, where the court was dealing with a state created right,6
it was said, "Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by
Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state.
And whether the law of the state shall be declared by its Legislature in a
statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern." 7
Thus, the court in effect said that state law, whether statutory or state de* Written while a student at the University of Denver College of Law.
1304 U. S. 64 (1938).

'Id. at 78.
Hinderlider v. LaPlatta River and Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U. S. 92 (1938).
'Id. at 110.
'See note, 59 Harvard Law Review 966 (1946), which seemingly calls into this
' Tompkins brought an action against the Erie Railroad for personal injuries caused
by the alleged negligence of the defendant in the state of Pennsylvania.
' Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, supra at 78.
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cisional law, must be applied in the federal courts whenever a state created
right is involved, whatever may be the basis of jurisdiction. This left room
for the application of federal law, whether statutory or federal common law,
by the federal courts wherever a federally created right is involved, whatever
may be the basis of jurisdiction.
In other words, whether the federal court is bound to apply the law as
interpreted by the courts of a state under authority of the Erie case will
depend, not upon the basis of jurisdiction-diversity or federal question-but
rather upon the nature of the right involved, i.e., state created or federally
created. s This construction is, of course, in keeping with the reason behind
the Erie decision (the need for uniformity of decision between the federal and
state courts) in that the uniformity is not limited to cases of diversity only.
What are these federally created rights which are outside the scope of
the Erie case and to which the federal common law may be applied? These
rights arise in cases which can be generally classified into three categories: first,
where the United States is a party to the action as a result of contract or
otherwise; second, where the right is within the sweep of a federal statute;
and third, where Congress has "occupied the field" wherein the right arises.
Each of these categories will be discussed separately.
Federally Created Rights Where the United States is a Party
It should be noted here that if it is correct to say that the Erie doctrine
is limited to cases where federal jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship (as is -often, and it is believed fallaciously, assumed), then this line
of cases can be explained on that ground alone because jurisdiction here rests
on the fact that the United States is a party. However, it seems better to say
that this line of cases involves federally created rights and thus falls outside
the application of the Erie rule.
A typical case falling into this group is Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
StatesY In that case there was involved a check drawn upon the Treasurer of
the United States payable to one Barner for WPA services rendered by him.
This check was dated April 28, 1936, and although placed in the mail addressed to Barner, it was intercepted by some unknown person who forged the
payee's name and cashed it at the store of the J. C. Penney Co. in Clearfield,
Pennsylvania, which paid value in good faith. The J. C. Penney Co. endorsed
the check to the Clearfield Trust Co., which collected it from the United
States through the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Shortly after this,
Barner notified his WPA foreman that he had not received the check.
It was not until January 12, 1937, however, that notice was given to the
Clearfield Trust Co. of the alleged forgery, and not until August 31, 1937
8 See Snepp, "The Law Applied in the Federal Courts," 13 Law and Contemporary
Problems 165, 168-169 (1948), as to the fallacy of limiting the Erie doctrine to diver-

sity cases.

318 U. S. 363 (1943).
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was it notified that the United States was asking reimbursement upon the check.
Suit was brought by the United States against the Clearfield Trust Co. on
November 16, 1939, and the J. C. Penney Co. subsequently intervened.
The federal district court applied Pennsylvania law and held for the trust
company. The circuit court reversed, and the Supreme Court affirmed in
favor of the United States. The court held that the Erie case was inapplicable
not because this was a non-diversity case, but because "the rights and duties
of the United States on commercial paper which it issues are governed by
federal rather than local law ...The authority to issue the check had its origin
in the Constitution and the statutes of the United States 10 and was in no
way dependent on the laws of Pennsylvania or of any other state .. .The
duties imposed upon the United States and the rights acquired by it as a
result of the issuance find their roots in the same federal sources . . . In
absence of an applicable Act of Congress, it is for the federal courts to
fashion the governing rule of law according to their own standards.""
Another case of this type is United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California. 12 In this case a soldier of the United States was injured by a motor
truck through the negligence of the driver. The expenses of his hospitalization
were borne by the United States, and he continued to receive his army pay
during the period of his disability. The United States brought suit in a federal district court against the owner and driver of the truck as tortfeasors to
recover the amounts expended for hospitalization and the soldier's pay during
the period of disability. The court held (as in the Clearfield case) that the
Erie case was inapplicable and that federal law governed because "not only is
the government-soldier relationship distinctively and exclusively a creation of
federal law 13 but we know of no good reason why the Government's right
to be indemnified in these circumstances, or lack of such right, should vary
in accordance with the rulings of the several states, simply because the soldier
marches or, today perhaps as often, flies across state lines". 14 In other words,
the right was federally created, and the federal common law applied even
though Congress had not acted affirmatively concerning the specific question.
A third case that falls within this group is Board of Commissioners v.
United States.'5 . This was an action brought by the United States in behalf
of one of its Indian wards for taxes unlawfully paid. A treaty between the
United States and the Pottawatomie Indians in 1861 had provided that lands
held by the United States in trust for the Pottawatomie Indians were exempt
from taxation. The lands in question were so held in trust, but the Secretary
of the Interior had cancelled the Indian ward's trust patent in 1918 and
issued a fee simple patent. As a result, Jackson County, Kansas began to
"Italics

are added.

Glearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318
C

U.S. 363, 366 (1943).

"332 U. S. 301 (1947).

are added.
"Italics
"United States v.Standard Oil of Calif., 332 U. S.301, 310 (1947).
" 308 U. S. 343 (1939).
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subject the lands to its regular property taxes. Later Congress authorized the
cancellation of such fee simple patents, and the United States commenced this
action to recover for its Indian ward the taxes paid to Jackson County. The
county urged that the Erie case bound the court to follow the Kansas law.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court, said, "Since the origin of the
right 16 to be enforced is the Treaty, plainly whatever rule we fashion is
ultimately attributable to the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United
States and does not owe its authority to the lawmaking agencies of Kansas." 17
Again the Court chose to distinguish the Erie doctrine on the basis that a
federally created right was involved rather than upon the mere fact that this
was not a diversity case.
From the language of the Court in the above mentioned cases, it becomes
evident that the Court has not chosen to rest its decisions on the somewhat
narrow ground that the basis of jurisdiction in the federal court was not
diversity of citizenship. The Court looks, rather, to the origin of the right
which is sought to be enforced.
Where Rights Are Within The Sweep of a Federal Statute
There has never been any question as to whether state or federal law
would be applied when the right involved was a direct and express creation
of a federal statute. The more difficult problems arise where federal statutes
fail to define certain rights which are, nevertheless, implied in the policy of
the statutes. This type of situation is illustrated in the early post-Erie case of
Deitrick v. Greaney 18 wherein an action was brought by a receiver of a national banking association to compel payment of a promissory note. The Court
refused to accept a defense on the note raised by the defendant which was
based on local law. The Court brushed aside the Erie argument by stating and
thus deciding: "But it is the federal statute which condemns as unlawful respondent's acts. The extent and nature of the legal consequences of this condemnation, though left by statute to judicial determination, are nevertheless
to be derived from it and the federal policy which it has adopted". 19
In the case of D'Oench, Duhme and Co. v. FDIC,20 the facts involved a suit by the FDIC on a note given to a bank by the defendant.
The defendant had a secret agreement with the bank that the note would not
be enforced. The defenses on the note were lack of consideration because of
the agreement and that the FDIC was not a holder in due course. The
majority decided the case in favor of the FDIC on the basis of federal law,
relying on the analogy of Deitrick v. Greaney. Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring,
said, "I do not understand Justice Bandeis' statement in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 at 78, that 'There is no federal general common law', to
" Italics are added.

"Board of Commissioners v. U. S., 308 U. S. 343, 349 (1939).
18309 U.

S. 190 (1940).

, 8 Id. at 200.
2°315 U. S. 447 (1942).
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deny that the common law may in proper cases be an aid to, or the basis of,
decision of federal questions."

21

He then said:

"Federal law is no juridical chameleon, changing complexion to
match that of each state wherein lawsuits happen to be commenced because of the accidents of service and of the application of the venue
statutes. It is found in the federal Constitution, statutes, or common
law. Federal common law implements the Federal Constitution and
statutes and is conditioned by them. Within these limits, federal
courts are free to apply the traditional common-law technique of decision and to draw upon all the sources of the common law in cases
22
such as the present."
It should be noticed that in these cases the federal statute does not
specifically cover the matter in question. Neverthless, the court has treated
the rights as being federally created because the cases arise under laws of
the United States. As Mr. Justice Jackson said, concurring in the D'Oench
case, "Although by Congressional command this case is to be deemed one
arising under the laws of the United States, no federal statute purports to
dr,6ne the Corporation's rights as a holder of the note in suit, or the liability
ot .'e maker thereof". 23 That is the reason the cases have been classified as
falling "within the sweep" of the federal statute rather than directly under
the statute.
Federally Created Rights Where Congress Has Occupied the Field
Into the third category will fall those rights which might well have been
found to be state created rights had it not been for the fact that by the enactment of a more or less comprehensive statute within the field, Congress has
given expression to its desire to bring about uniformity in a particular branch
of the law and to bring particular matters within the purview of federal, rather
than state, influence. Examples of this third category will likely be found
most frequently in the field of regulation of interstate commerce as Congress
exerts its influence into new fields of activity.
In O'Brien v. Western Union Telegraph Company,2 4 a defamatory mes-

sage concerning the plaintiff was transmitted by the defendant from a point in
Massachusetts to a point in Michigan. In the libel suit in the Massachusetts
federal court there was a jury verdict for the defendant. Plaintiff excepted
to the refusal of the trial court to rule as a matter of law that the transmission
was not privileged. Neither Massachusetts nor Michigan courts had decided
whether a telegraph company had such a privilege, but the Communications
Act of 1934 had provided: "It shall be unlawful for any common carrier to
make any unjust or unreasonable discrimination in services . . ." 25 The court
n22 Id. at 469.
Id. at 471
22 Id. at 472.
24

113 F(2d) 539 (1940).

: 37 U. S. C. sec. 202(a).
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held that neither the Michigan nor Massachusetts law would be binding,
since the telegram was an interstate message and the telegraph company an
interstate carrier subject to the federal act. The court said:
"Congress having occupied the field 2G by enacting a fairly comprehensive scheme of regulation, it seems clear that questions relating
to the duties, privileges and liabilities of telegraph companies in the
transmission of interstate messages must be governed by uniform federal rules. . . Notwithstanding Erie Railroad Co. v. TomPkins there
still exist certain fields-and this is one-where legal relations are governed by a 'federal common law', a body of decisional law developed
27
by the federal courts untrammeled by state court decisions."1
The latest case of this group is Francis v. Southern Pacific Co. 28 Here

the suit was brought by guardians of minor children to recover damages
from the railroad for the death of the father, who was killed while riding on
a train of the defendant. Jurisdiction was founded on diversity. The deceased
had been riding on a free pass which provided by its terms that the user
assumed all risk of injury to person or property whether by negligence or
otherwise, and the user absolved the issuing company from liability therefor.
Under the applicable local law (Utah), recovery is permitted against a railroad when its negligence was responsible for a passenger's death, whether the
passenger rides on a free pass containing at attempted waiver of liability for
negligence or pays his fare in money. The Hepburn Act,2 however, one of
the various statutes regulating interstate commerce, deals with "free passes"
on interstate carriers. As early as 1904, even before the Hepburn Act, the
Supreme Court had held that a provision in a free pass similar to the one
in the instant case absolved the railroad from liability caused by ordinary
negligence.30 The Hepburn Act was passed in 1906 and limited the cases in
which free passes could be issued, and after that act the course of decisions
remained consistent with the Adams case.3 1 In 1940 the statutes dealing with
railroads were revamped and the free pass provisions were modified only to
permit free transportation to additional classes of persons-no changes were
made in the established judicial interpretation. In view of this history, the
court determined that the issuance of free passes and the judicial determination of their legal effect was a federal matter to the exclusion of the state law
and Erie had no application. In other words, the Court felt that the provision
for passes in the act, with its sanction in penalties, was a "regulation of interstate commerce to the completion of which the determination of the effect
of the passes is necessary".a 2 The Court felt that Congress, through the act,
" Italics are added.
" 113 F(2d) 539, 541 (1940).
23333 U. S. 445 (1948).
49 U. S. C. Sec. 1 (1940).

"0Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Adams, 192 U. S. 440 (1904).
Ibid.
' 333 U. S. 445, 449 (1948).
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had decreed this to be a federal problem which should be governed by federal,
rather than state, law. This case thus goes far in saying that such a right is
federally created, but it is a good example of the expansion of the "federal
fields" doctrine by the ever stretching idea of what constitutes a federally
created right.
The cases which have been referred to in the course of this paper are by
no means the only cases that have been decided since Erie v. Tompkins wherein
the court still felt free to apply federal common law. However, they are
sufficient to illustrate the realization on the part of the Supreme Court that
some degree of uniformity in the application of national law is necessary for
a workable federal system. That is not to say that diversity of laws should
not be permitted between states on matters which are clearly within the
scope of state regulation. But on matters which are, under our Constitution,
placed under the control of the national government, national uniformity is
necessary. Decisional or common law is everywhere relied on in legal systems
founded upon Anglo-American law, and federal common law is a constantly
expanding body of law in our judicial system today.

The Book Trader's Corner
O'Rourke and Kempf of Montrose are anxious to trade their duplicate
volumes of Colorado reports. They have extra copies of volumes 68 to 72,
and 75 to 90, and are in need of Court of Appeals volumes 11, 21 and 22
and Colorado reports 95 to 104.
Anyone wishing to sell a full set of Board of Tax Appeal reports should
contact the secretary, 319 Chamber of Commerce Bldg., Denver.
Marion Porter, who still maintains his membership in the Colorado Bar
Association although he is practicing in Billings, Mont., is interested in outfitting a whole new library with Pacific reporters, Pacific 2nd, C.J., C.J.S., or
Am. Jur., Montana reports, ALRs, Hillyer or Bancroft on Pleading and
Practice, and California jurisprudence books.

Midwestern Association Names New Officers
At its annual meeting on September 24, the Midwestern Colorado Bar
Association elected Charles S. Thomas of Paonia, president, Jack Hughes of
Montrose, vice president, and W. G. Waldeck of Montrose, secretary-treasurer.
Two members of the Denver bar, Judge Joseph J. Walsh and former Supreme
Court Justice R. Hickman Walker, were guest speakers for the meeting held
this year at Paonia.

New Otero-Crowley Officers
Officers of the Otero-Crowley Bar Association for the current year are:
Cover Mendenhall of Rocky Ford, president; George L. Strain of La Junta,
vice-president; and Robert A. Trainor of Ordway, secretary-treasurer.

